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In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement,
sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making
their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show, however,
that competition for repayment between lenders may result in a sov-
ereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium.
This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy
regime that facilitates debt restructuring.
I. Introduction
The composition of sovereign debt and how it affects debt restructuring
negotiations in the event of financial distress has become a central policy
issue in recent years. There are two major reasons why the spotlight has
been turned on this question. First, the change in the International
Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) policy orientation toward sovereign debt cri-
ses, with a proposed greater weight on “private-sector involvement” (Rey
Report, G-10 1996), has brought up the question of how easy it actually
is to get “the private sector involved,” that is, how easy it is to get private
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debt holders to agree to a debt restructuring. Second, the experience
with several recent debt restructuring episodes—some of which were
followed by defaults and by private litigation to recover debt payments—
has raised concerns that the uncoordinated efforts of dispersed debt
holders to renegotiate sovereign debt obligations were likely to lead to
substantial delays and other inefficiencies.
These concerns have led a number of prominent commentators, a
majority of Group of 7 countries, and the IMF to advocate ex post policy
interventions to facilitate debt restructuring. A culmination point for
the calls for reform had been reached when the IMF’s Anne Krueger
put forward the idea of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism in-
spired by the U.S. corporate bankruptcy reorganization law under Chap-
ter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act (Krueger 2002).1 However, the en-
suing policy debate has left many commentators wondering why, in the
first place, sovereign debt had been structured to make it difficult to
renegotiate and why the structure of sovereign debt had evolved over
the past decade or so toward a greater share of sovereign bond issues
and greater dispersion of ownership of sovereign bonds. This article is
concerned with precisely these issues. Its starting point is the following
questions:
1. Why would a forward-looking sovereign want to design a sovereign
debt structure that is difficult to restructure?
2. Where are the contractual failures between the borrower and lend-
ers that justify an ex post policy intervention to facilitate debt
restructuring?
Several commentators (Dooley 2000; Shleifer 2003) have argued that
because of the sovereign’s incentive to repudiate its debts (the well-
known willingness-to-pay problem), it may be ex ante efficient to struc-
ture sovereign debt to make it difficult to renegotiate ex post. A policy
intervention that aims to reduce these restructuring costs, while im-
proving ex post efficiency, might thus undermine ex ante efficiency.
Such a policy would have the effect of raising the cost of borrowing and
would result in a reduction of lending to emerging market countries.2
Our article builds on this very idea that debts that are more difficult
to restructure are less vulnerable to repudiation, but it stops short of
concluding that sovereign debt that is difficult to restructure is neces-
sarily ex ante efficient. We add to the theme that lenders seek protection
against a generalized default by a sovereign, the idea that individual
1 See Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002) for a history and overview of the different proposals.
2 The idea that under limited enforcement it may be desirable to create a debt structure
that is difficult to renegotiate is, of course, a familiar theme in corporate finance. See,
e.g., Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Hart and Moore (1995), Bolton and Scharfstein
(1996), Diamond and Rajan (2001), and Diamond (2004).
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lenders also seek to protect themselves individually against selective
defaults by the sovereign on a subset of its debts. Thus, by attempting
to divert a selective default onto other debts, individual lenders may
end up providing too much debt that is difficult to restructure. Just as
a burglar alarm may be an individually optimal protection against break-
ins for an individual house owner (by inducing prospective burglars to
target other houses without such an alarm system), collectively, having
all houses equipped with an alarm could well be self-defeating and
inefficient.
By lending in the form of debt that is hard to restructure, individual
lenders are able to effectively make their debts more senior to other
debts that are easier to restructure and, therefore, more likely to be
selected for a default by the sovereign ex post. Or, put differently, with
each debt issue, the sovereign may attempt to lower the cost of bor-
rowing by committing to high future restructuring costs of that partic-
ular issue and thus providing a form of seniority to that issue. This de
facto seniority can be obtained in various ways, for example, by lifting
sovereign immunity, by widely dispersing the debt and insisting on a
unanimity requirement for restructuring the debt, by lowering the ma-
turity of the debt, by denominating the debt in dollars, or by inserting
acceleration clauses. Thus, a form of Gresham law for sovereign debt
may arise; bad debt structures that are hard to restructure tend to crowd
out good debts that are easier to renegotiate.
Our article argues that there is, therefore, a role for policy interven-
tion in sovereign lending that would improve both ex ante and ex post
efficiency. This policy intervention should take the general form of
facilitating the restructuring of hard debt. Thus, our theory has some
implications for the reforms of the international financial architecture
that have been discussed in recent debates, and in particular the desir-
ability of a bankruptcy regime for sovereigns. We argue that because of
the competition between lenders to deflect a selective default, sovereign
debt might be excessively hard to restructure in equilibrium even from
an ex ante perspective. A bankruptcy regime for sovereigns could then
mitigate this inefficiency by facilitating debt restructuring in a sovereign
debt crisis.
In our model, the contractual approach to sovereign debt restruc-
turing endorsed by the official community,3 which is limited to moral
suasion over issuers to introduce majority-rule clauses for the restruc-
turing of debt in bond issues (so-called collective action clauses or
3 The contractual approach advocated by the official sector is outlined in G-10 (1996)
and G-22 (1998).
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CACs), does not work.4 As we show, efficiency cannot be achieved by
leaving sovereign borrowers free to include or not renegotiation-friendly
clauses in their debt. In equilibrium, the adoption of such clauses will
be inefficiently low. However, a policy that encourages the adoption of
such clauses through a system of taxes or subsidies or other arm-twisting
(as advocated by Kenen [2001] or Eichengreen [2003]), or by making
their use mandatory, could achieve the same effect as a restructuring
under a bankruptcy regime.
Although our analysis provides support for a bankruptcy regime or
some form of mandated or subsidized CACs, we also emphasize that
such an intervention may easily be welfare reducing if it is not carefully
designed. Indeed, it could undermine sovereign debt markets if it gives
too little bargaining power to lenders in a renegotiation.
Our article contributes to the literature on sovereign debt default and
restructuring. A number of authors have emphasized the importance
of selective default in sovereign debt. Dooley (2000) and Kenen (2001),
for example, emphasize the conflict between official and private lenders
in the competition for repayment. Tirole (2002, chap. 4) discusses the
contracting externalities arising from selective default and mentions
seniority as a possible solution to this problem. In our companion paper
(Bolton and Jeanne 2005), we analyze a dynamic model of sovereign
debt and focus on the problem of debt dilution induced by selective
defaults. We show how the resulting inefficiency can be mitigated by
the enforcement of a de jure seniority rule for sovereign debt. As we
document in Section II, practitioners also pay a great deal of attention
to the implicit seniority status of the different types of sovereign debt.
However, although commentators and practitioners are aware of the
issue, the implications of selective default on sovereign debt to our
knowledge have not been explored systematically before.
This article is structured as follows. Section II reviews some stylized
facts on sovereign debt that motivate the theoretical analysis in the rest
of the paper. Section III lays out the model and basic assumptions.
Section IV characterizes the socially efficient debt structure. Section V
analyzes equilibrium debt structures. Section VI discusses public policy
implications, and Section VII presents conclusions.
II. Evidence on Selective Defaults
This section presents evidence suggesting that there is an implicit sen-
iority structure for sovereign debt and that this structure is related to
4 Collective action clauses facilitate bond restructurings by lowering the threshold for
agreement of a restructuring by bondholders from unanimity to a 75 percent super-
majority rule.
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the perceived difficulty with which debt can be restructured. The im-
plicit seniority in sovereign debt is an understudied topic, on which
there has been little empirical and theoretical research. We will present
a few facts as well as market commentaries that suggest that seniority is
a real issue for sovereign debt structuring and restructuring. The in-
terested reader will find more detailed discussions of the evidence in
Zettelmeyer (2003), Roubini and Setser (2004), and Sturzenegger and
Zettelmeyer (2006).
The de facto seniority structure of sovereign debt is, for one thing,
apparent from the different treatment of different classes of creditors
in a default. The differential treatment of claims has been a character-
istic of most debt restructurings that have taken place over the last 25
years (beginning with the debt renegotiations and write-downs of the
1980s and the Brady plan and continuing with the more recent debt
restructurings in Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, and Uruguay). This
differential treatment has taken the form not only of entirely excluding
some debts (in particular, multilateral official debt) from debt restruc-
turings, but also of negotiating more favorable deals for subclasses of
private claims. Thus, for example, the “Brady deals” that settled the debt
crises of the 1980s restructured bank loans but not international bonds
(Merrill Lynch 1995).
More recently, the composition of sovereign debt has shifted away
from syndicated bank loans, which were the dominant form of lending
in the 1970s and 1980s, toward bond finance (fig. 1). While there is no
single cause that explains this change in composition, one reason, un-
doubtedly, has been the perception, following the debt crises of the
1980s and the Brady deals, that syndicated bank loans were too easy to
restructure. In valuing the new bond issues, at least some lenders have
factored in a lower risk of restructuring of international bonds. To the
extent that these bond issues were widely dispersed, they were perceived
to be more difficult to restructure and therefore less likely to be re-
structured in a debt crisis: “There are several things that make inter-
national bonds much harder to restructure than loans. First, they typ-
ically involve many more investors than do loans, even syndicated loans.
Second, they may be in bearer form so investors may be untraceable”
(Peterson 1999).
The debt crises and defaults of Russia (1998–2000) and Argentina
(2001–5) have highlighted just how difficult comprehensive debt re-
structuring negotiations can be, when they involve hundreds of
thousands of different bondholders with a wide variety of objectives.5
5 Debt restructuring has been facilitated, in some cases, by the creative use of exit consent
clauses (Buchheit and Gulati 2000), leading Roubini and Setser (2004) to conclude that
the lack of creditor coordination has been overstated as an impediment to debt restruc-
turing. However, the expectation that bonded debt would be difficult to restructure seems
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Fig. 1.—Structure of external public debt of middle-income countries: bonds vs. loans
(1980–2005, in billions of U.S. dollars). Source: World Bank’s Global Development Finance
database. The figure shows the outstanding aggregate stock of privately held long-term
public and publicly guaranteed debt for middle-income countries in the form of bonds
and commercial bank loans.
Following more than three years of listless negotiations, the Argentine
government launched a global debt exchange for 152 different securities
amounting to 60 percent of its GDP. Although the exchange has been
accepted by a majority of creditors, the legal status of this debt restruc-
turing remains in doubt since many bond issues required unanimous
consent from the bondholders to be restructured. The Argentine gov-
ernment has since had to face a large number of creditor lawsuits that
are still pending at the time of writing, and Argentina has still not
regained access to the international capital market.6
During most of the 1990s the differential treatment of sovereign
claims has followed a pattern that is consistent with an implicit seniority
of international bonds over international bank loans. A total of 93 sov-
ereigns have defaulted on their syndicated bank loans since 1975, in-
cluding 20 that had bonds outstanding at the same time that their bank
loans were in default. Yet only nine out of these 20 sovereigns also
to have played a significant role in shaping the equilibrium structure of sovereign debt
in the 1990s.
6 It has been argued that the flow cost of market exclusion did not seem to be very
high, by the evidence of the Argentine growth rate in recent years. Still, the economic
disruption associated with the default, especially in the domestic banking sector, exacted
a steep cost in terms of output collapse in the first year following the default (GDP fell
by more than 15 percent in 2001–2).
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defaulted on their bonds, and the others serviced them in full (Beers
and Chambers 2003).
The restructuring of Russian sovereign debt (1998–2000) is typical of
this pattern. Domestic debt and Soviet-era London and Paris Club debts
have been restructured, whereas Eurobonds have been left untouched.
Market participants have viewed this latest Russian debt restructuring
episode as further corroboration of the sovereigns’ tendency of treating
creditors differently according to their power of nuisance.
Market participants were also well aware that such behavior resulted
in an implicit seniority structure affecting the pricing and valuation of
debt:
It is that implicit seniority which, in part, explains why bonds
have become such favoured instruments for countries raising
debt in recent years, says Ernesto Martinez Alas, an analyst at
Moody’s. (Peterson 1999, 50)
The majority of governments treated bonds as being effectively
senior to bank loans, and they did so with the tacit consent of
bank creditors. (Beers and Chambers 2003)
In summary, the evidence points to the following stylized facts that
our theory will attempt to capture and explain:
• Sovereigns do not default in the same way on different classes of
debt instruments, and this selectivity generates an implicit seniority
between debt classes.
• Seniority seems related to structural features of sovereign debt that
make it more or less easy to renegotiate with creditors.
• International investors are aware of this implicit seniority structure
and pay close attention to potential shifts in its determinants.
• The composition of international sovereign debt has shifted to the
class of instruments that was perceived as senior during the 1990s.
III. The Model: Assumptions
We consider a small open economy over two periods with a single ho-
mogeneous good that can be consumed or invested. The representative
resident of this economy may raise funds from the rest of the world by
issuing (sovereign) debt in the first period ( ) to be repaid in thetp 1
next period ( ). The funds raised in the first period can be usedtp 2
for consumption or investment purposes.
To keep the analysis as tractable as possible, we specify the following
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simple form for the utility function of the representative resident:
U p V(g) c,2
U p E (U ),1 1 2
where g is the level of public expenditure in period 1 and c is private
consumption in period 2. The sovereign is assumed to act on behalf of
the representative resident and maximizes her welfare.
The representative resident receives an exogenous stochastic endow-
ment y in period 2, which is distributed according to the probability
distribution function . Again for simplicity we shall assume that theref(7)
is no taxable output in period 1 so that the government finances g
entirely by borrowing from foreign lenders. We shall assume that g is
exogenously given and is such that , where denotes the0 ! g ! E(y) E(y)
expected endowment in period 2.7
In reality most sovereigns’ borrowing needs are such that they have
no choice but to borrow from multiple lenders. When a sovereign bor-
rows from different lenders, the issue of strategic default is more com-
plex since the sovereign can choose to selectively default on some of
the lenders and not on others. Accordingly, any individual lender will
be concerned not only about the risk of a full default by the sovereign
but also about the relative risk of a selective default on its own debt.
An individual lender can guard himself to some extent against the risk
of a selective default by lending through a debt instrument that is dif-
ficult to restructure. Thus, to allow for multiple lenders, as well as dif-
ferent types of debts in terms of how difficult they are to restructure,
we shall model the sovereign debt lending game as follows.
A. Lending Game
In period 1 there is a continuum of atomistic lenders (indexed by
) from which the sovereign can borrow. Each of these lenders isi  I
able to lend g, so that the sovereign must borrow from a subset of mass
one of lenders. The total mass of lenders is large, ensuring that perfect
competition prevails and lenders do not extract any rent. The lenders
have access to a zero-return storage technology.
The lending game can be viewed as a general (common agency)
contracting game between a principal (the sovereign) and multiple
agents (the lenders) as, for example, in Bernheim and Whinston (1986a,
1986b), Hart and Tirole (1990), or Segal (1999). Specifically, we follow
Segal by letting lenders participate in a bidding game following the
7 See Bolton and Jeanne (2005) for a more general model in which g is optimally
determined by the sovereign.
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sovereign’s announcement of a fund-raising goal of g. Lenders move
first by each simultaneously making a bid. The sovereign then decides
which bids to accept.
At the bidding stage of the game each lender i makes an offer d(i)
of the period 2 debt repayment in exchange for a loan g. We assume
that there are two types of lenders: those with whom the sovereign can
renegotiate the repayment of the debt (denoted by r) and those with
whom renegotiation is impossible (denoted by n). We explain below
the precise difference in our model between renegotiable and nonre-
negotiable debt.
In the second stage of the bidding game the sovereign chooses which
bids to accept. The sovereign selects the bids that maximize domestic
welfare and selects randomly between identical bids. At the end of the
bidding game the sovereign is thus potentially indebted to two classes
of creditors: r-creditors (the holders of renegotiable debt) and n-cred-
itors (the holders of nonrenegotiable debt).
The lenders’ utility is equal to their period 2 consumption. Finally, a
Nash equilibrium of the lending game is defined as a set of bids
such that, for all i, bid maximizes lender i’s utility taking all(d(i)) d(i)iI
the other bids , , as given.d( j) j( i
The noncooperative nature of the game reflects the idea that it is
difficult for lenders to coordinate themselves or be coordinated by the
sovereign. Given that there is an excess supply of lenders, the lenders
attempt to win the lending contest by offering the most attractive terms
to the government. Therefore, one should expect an equilibrium out-
come in which the sovereign receives all the surplus from the lending
relationship.
B. Repayment Game
We shall denote by and the respective mass of r-creditors and n-N Nr n
creditors ( ). We look at symmetric equilibria in which allN  N p 1r n
creditors of a given type make the same bid , so that thevp r, n d v
sovereign’s total repayments of renegotiable debt and nonrenegotiable
debt that come due in period 2 are
d N  d N { D  D .r r n n r n
The promise to repay is credible only if it is in the sovereign’sD  Dr n
interest to repay its debt obligations ex post. We follow the sovereign
debt literature by assuming that the sovereign repays its debts only as
a way of avoiding a costly default. As in Sachs and Cohen (1982) and
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), we model the cost of default as a propor-
910 journal of political economy
tional output loss, gy.8 We interpret this cost as a sanction imposed by
creditors on the defaulting sovereign (see Bulow and Rogoff [1989] for
a discussion of such sanctions).9 To simplify the algebra, and without
loss of generality, we assume that , so that creditors can destroygp 1
all the resources of a defaulting sovereign.
For simplicity we assume that renegotiable debt can be renegotiated
at no cost, but that nonrenegotiable debt is impossible to renegotiate
since these debts are too widely dispersed and since a unanimous agree-
ment is required to renegotiate the debt.10 For example, one can think
of the renegotiable debt as syndicated bank loans and nonrenegotiable
debt as bonds held by a large number of dispersed bondholders.
The sovereign is always better off repaying the n-creditors than losing
all the domestic output because of the sanctions. Thus a full default
(on both types of creditors) will occur only if the sovereign is unable
to repay the n-creditors:
y ! D .n
The sovereign could also renegotiate the repayment of its r-debt while
it repays fully its n-debt (selective default). We shall assume that in a
selective default, r-creditors receive a fraction of the netq  [0, 1]
surplus from renegotiation (net after repayment of the n-credi-y Dn
tors). It follows that the sovereign chooses a selective default over full
repayment if
y D  q(y D ) 1 y D  Dn n n r
or if
Dry ! D  .n
q
In summary, the payoffs of the different players in the selective default
8 It is generally assumed in the literature that the cost of defaulting is the same whether
the sovereign defaults in full or whether it repays part of its debt. This is a somewhat
extreme assumption. One might want to consider the more general default cost function
, where is increasing in the repayment shortfall s from zero to a maximum value,g(s)y g(s)
. Our analysis would be virtually unchanged if we allowed for this more general defaultg ! 1¯
cost function.
9 Another approach views the cost of default as a loss of reputation (e.g., Eaton and
Gersovitz 1981). See Bolton and Jeanne (2005) for a model of sovereign debt restructuring
that includes both types of cost.
10 The inability to renegotiate the debt ex post may be to the detriment of bondholders’
collective interests. Even so, because of a free-rider problem—as in Diamond and Rajan
(2001) or Jeanne (2004)—widely dispersed debts will not be renegotiable ex post. For
example, individual litigating creditors could hope to seize some collateral but might
impose an output cost on the country that is much larger than the value of collateral that
they can seize collectively. Similarly, the bondholders may be unable to accept a voluntary
decentralized debt exchange or repurchase, even an efficient one, because of free riding
by holdouts (Bulow and Rogoff 1991).
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TABLE 1
The Sovereign’s and Creditors’ Payoffs in the Repayment Game
Full Default Selective Default Full Repayment
y ! Dn D ≤ y ! D  (D /q)n n r D  (D /q) ≤ yn r
Sovereign 0 (1 q)(y D )n y D  Dr n
r-creditors 0 q(y D )n Dr
n-creditors 0 Dn Dn
game are given in table 1. And we obtain the following result charac-
terizing ex post equilibrium default.
Proposition 1. The sovereign’s debt repayment strategy is as fol-
lows:
a. Full repayment: If , the sovereign fully repays bothy ≥ D  (D /q)n r
types of debt.
b. Selective default: If , the sovereign fully repaysD ≤ y ! D  (D /q)n n r
the nonrenegotiable debt and agrees on a reduction of the rene-
gotiable debt to with the r-creditors.q(y D )n
c. Full default: If , the sovereign defaults on both types of debt.y ! Dn
Proof. See the discussion above.
This proposition highlights the notion that nonrenegotiable debt is
effectively senior to renegotiable debt. In the event of a selective default,
the allocation of the repayments between r-creditors and n-creditors is
the same as if the latter enjoyed strict seniority over the former.
IV. Optimal Debt Structure
As a benchmark, we begin by characterizing the debt structure chosen
by a social planner, subject to the lenders’ participation constraints.
That constraint is given by
V(D , D ) ≥ g, (1)r n
where , the lenders’ total expected payoff, is given byV(D , D )r n
D (D /q)n r
V(D , D )p [qy (1 q)D ]f(y)dyr n  n
Dn

 (D  D ) f(y)dy. (2)r n 
D (D /q)n r
The sovereign’s ex ante welfare can be written as the utility of the
public expenditure g plus the total final expected surplus net of the
agency costs of debt, or
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D (D /q)n r
U(D , D )p V(g) (1 q)(y D )f(y)dyr n  n
Dn

 (y D  D )f(y)dy, r n
D (D /q)n r
p V(g) E(y) V(D , D ) L(D ), (3)r n n
where the expected deadweight loss is given by the expected valueL(D )n
of the output lost in a full default:
Dn
L(D )p yf(y)dy. (4)n 
0
The optimal debt structure thus minimizes the deadweight loss (or,




subject to V(D , D ) ≥ g.r n
The deadweight loss is reduced to zero, therefore, if and only if there
is no nonrenegotiable debt,11
D p 0.n
However, it may not be possible for the social planner to finance g when
. For a given level of nonrenegotiable debt , the level of ex-D p 0 Dn n
pected output that the sovereign can credibly pledge to foreign lenders
is maximized when goes to infinity, and the maximum pledgeableDr
output is given by12

V(D )p [qy (1 q)D ]f(y)dy.n  n
Dn
The sovereign can finance g without taking the risk of a full default if
, that is, if the bargaining power of the r-creditors isV(0)p qE(y) ≥ g
sufficiently large:
11 This result is due to our assumption that output realizations can be arbitrarily small.
If the distribution of output had a strictly positive lower bound , then a zero deadweighty
loss would require only that . Our results can be generalized to this case withoutD ≤ yn
difficulty.
12 Differentiating (2) shows that V is increasing with .Dr
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g
q ≥ q*{ .
E(y)
If this condition is not satisfied, the sovereign chooses the lowest level
of that is consistent with the lenders’ participation constraintDn
. The optimal level of is decreasing with q becauseV(D )p g D V(7)n n
increases with q. An increase in the creditors’ bargaining power allows
the sovereign to pledge them more output and thus to decrease its
reliance on nonrenegotiable debt. Conversely, in the limit case in which
creditors have no bargaining power ( ), the sovereign must financeqp 0
g entirely with nonrenegotiable debt. We assume that this is possible
because .max V(0, D ) ≥ gD nn
Our results on the first-best debt structure are summarized in the
proposition below.
Proposition 2. Assume that the sovereign debt structure is chosen
by a social planner. Then there is a threshold in the creditors’ bargaining
power, , such that (1) if , a fraction of the sovereignq*p g/E(y) q ! q*
debt is nonrenegotiable; this fraction is decreasing with q; (2) if q ≥
, the sovereign’s debt is entirely renegotiable.q*
Proof. See the discussion above.
Nonrenegotiable debt may have a role to play because it is a “hard
claim” that allows the sovereign to pledge more domestic output to
foreign creditors. If renegotiable debt is too “soft” (because creditors
have too little bargaining power), some nonrenegotiable debt might be
required to harden the overall debt structure.
V. Equilibrium Debt Structure
As we shall show in this section, when the sovereign borrows from mul-
tiple uncoordinated lenders, the equilibrium sovereign debt structure
includes an excessive level of nonrenegotiable debt. The reason is simply
that for some lenders a best response to other lenders’ bids is to submit
a bid in the form of nonrenegotiable debt as a way of deflecting a
possible selective default onto other debt issues. Moreover, the sovereign
will accept these bids because they involve a lower cost of capital.
We denote by, respectively, and the total expected payoff ofV Vr n
holding r-debt, , and n-debt, . Similarly, we denote by and theD D P Pr n r n
fair prices of renegotiable and nonrenegotiable debts:
D (D /q) n rV q(y D )r nP p p f(y)dy f(y)dy (5)r  D Dr D r D (D /q)n n r
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and

VnP p p f(y)dy. (6)n Dn Dn
Thus, and are the dollar values of one dollar of repayment ofP Pr n
renegotiable and nonrenegotiable debt. One can check that nonrene-
gotiable debt is worth more on the dollar than renegotiable debt by
computing
D (D /q)n r
q DrP  P p D   y f(y)dy 1 0. (7)n r  n( )D qr Dn
The price difference reflects the effective seniority of nonrenegotiable
debt over renegotiable debt in the event of a selective default.
In a Nash equilibrium of the lending game the pair of debt repay-
ments must be such that no lender has a strict incentive to(d , d )r n
deviate by offering a different type of debt or a different face value.
Moreover, if the sovereign borrows from lenders of type , thosevp r, n
lenders must just break even: . Indeed, those lenders would beP d p gv v
better off not lending if the repayment were such that . Sim-d P d ! gv v v
ilarly, as there is an excess mass of lenders, there would be a profitable
deviation for any individual lender if the repayments were such thatd v
of bidding (where is arbitrarily small) and thusP d 1 g d    1 0v v v
securing a profitable loan with probability one.
Consider next the sovereign’s problem. After lenders have made their
bids , the sovereign chooses the debt structure that maximizes(d , d )r n
domestic welfare subject to meeting the sovereign’s financing constraint:
max U(D , D )r n
D ,Dr n
D Dr nsubject to  p 1, D ≥ 0, D ≥ 0,r nd dr n
where is the number of creditors of type v.D /d p Nv v v
We distinguish between two types of equilibria: (1) interior equilibria,
in which the sovereign issues both types of debt ( and ); andD 1 0 D 1 0r n
(2) corner equilibria, in which the sovereign issues one type of debt
only ( or ).D p 0 D p 0r n
The equilibrium debt structure can then be characterized in two steps.
First, we show that an interior equilibrium cannot exist.
Lemma 1. A Nash equilibrium of the lending game is such that the
sovereign borrows in the form of either fully renegotiable ( ) orD p 0n
fully nonrenegotiable ( ) debt.D p 0r
Proof. See the Appendix.
Only two corner equilibria can exist because the sovereign’s objective
structuring and restructuring sovereign debt 915
function is convex in and . Therefore, the sovereign, who canD Dr n
borrow arbitrary quantities of debt at given prices, always chooses a
corner solution and issues only one type of debt.
A corner equilibrium with debt of type v in turn exists if and only if
a lender of type cannot deviate by making a profitable offer that′v ( v
is accepted by the sovereign. A profitable bid must yield a strictly positive
net return and be such that
g(1 a)
d p , (8)′v P ′v
where denotes the net return on the bid (if it is accepted). Sucha 1 0
a bid would allow the sovereign to make a marginal swap in its debt
structure and such thatdD ! 0 dD 1 0′v v
dD dv vp  . (9)
dD d′ ′v v
In a corner equilibrium, such a deviation should not increase the sov-
ereign’s welfare. Or, from
U U
dUp dD  dD ,′v v
D D ′v v
(8), (9), and , this amounts togp P dv v
1 P U U′vdUp   dD ≤ 0. (10)′v( )1 a P D D ′v v v
This condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a corner
equilibrium with debt of type v. We then establish the following result.
Lemma 2. A corner equilibrium with nonrenegotiable debt always
exists. A corner equilibrium with renegotiable debt exists only if the
bargaining power of creditors is such that
ˆq ≤ q,
where is larger than q* but smaller than one.qˆ
Proof. See the Appendix.
In a corner equilibrium with n-debt, the sovereign does not increase
domestic welfare by accepting an offer from an r-lender. By accepting
such an offer, it would raise only the payoff of the n-creditors, who see
the value of their claims increase, since a marginal switch to r-debt
reduces the probability of default.
In contrast, a corner equilibrium with r-debt is more vulnerable to
aggressive bidding by excluded lenders. Any n-lender can then offer
debt at a lower interest rate than r-creditors, because of the effective
seniority of n-debt in selective defaults. The sovereign could then benefit
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from a marginal deviation to n-debt, at the expense of the outstanding
r-creditors who see the value of their claims decrease.
An interesting implication of this lemma is that the corner equilibrium
with renegotiable debt does not exist if the bargaining power of creditors
is large. This may seem paradoxical, since r-creditors should then worry
less about a selective default. To understand this result, consider the
effect of a marginal increase in n-debt, , associated with a mar-dD 1 0n
ginal decrease in r-debt, , at a corner equilibrium with r-debt.dD ! 0r
The n-lenders are ready to provide the new debt at price sinceP p 1n
the probability of a full default is infinitesimal. The impact of this mar-
ginal debt swap on the total value of debt can be obtained by differ-
entiating (3), setting , and using :D p 0 dD p dD /Pn r n r
D /q r dDndUp dD  q f(y)dydD  f(y)dy . (11)n  n  P0 D /q rr
The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the repayment of
the new n-debt. The second term corresponds to the reduction in the
repayment to r-creditors caused by the de facto seniority of n-debt in
selective defaults. Finally, the last term corresponds to the reduction in
the total face value of r-debt. A corner equilibrium with r-debt cannot
exist if , that is, if the second and third terms on the right-handdU 1 0
side of (11) are large enough.
The negative externality of n-debt on r-debt in selective defaults, which
is captured by the second term on the right-hand side of (11), is pro-
portional to the bargaining power of creditors q. The reason is that the
externality at work in a selective default is essentially a transfer of debt
recovery value from r-creditors to n-creditors. The expropriation of
r-creditors by n-creditors, thus, is proportional to the recovery value that
the r-creditors would receive in the absence of n-creditors, that is, to
their bargaining power. This explains why r-creditors’ greater bargaining
power actually increases the negative externality imposed by n-debt.
We are now ready to characterize the set of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 3.
1. There are two types of Nash equilibria: a corner equilibrium with
nonrenegotiable debt, which always exists, and a corner equilibrium
with renegotiable debt, which exists if and only if .ˆq  [q*, q]
2. There are two Pareto-ranked corner equilibria if : anˆq  [q*, q]
inefficient equilibrium with nonrenegotiable debt and an efficient
equilibrium with renegotiable debt.
Proof. The proposition follows from lemma 2 and proposition 2. It
is possible to finance the expenditure g with n-debt because of our
assumption that . By lemma 4 the corner equilibriummax V(0, D ) ≥ gD nn
with n-debt always exists.
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Fig. 2.—Share of nonrenegotiable debt in total debt. Source: authors’ computations.
The figure shows the share of n-debt in total debt repayment, , as a function ofP D /gn n
the creditors’ bargaining power q, at the optimum (panel A) and under laissez-faire (panel
B). The figure is constructed under the assumption that y is uniformly distributed in [0,
2] and .gp 0.4
Two conditions must be met for the corner equilibrium with r-debt
to exist. First, q must be high enough to allow the sovereign to pledge
enough output to finance g, that is, . By propositionmax V(D , 0) ≥ gD rr
2 this is true if and only if . Second, q must be smaller than ˆq ≥ q* q
by lemma 2. Thus the corner equilibrium with r-debt exists if and only
if . This interval is nonempty by lemma 2.ˆq  [q*, q]
When , the conditions for the existence of an r-debt equi-ˆq  [q*, q]
librium and n-debt equilibrium are simultaneously satisfied. Finally,
since the r-debt equilibrium involves no deadweight cost of default, it
strictly dominates the n-debt equilibrium. QED
The equilibria are illustrated in figure 2, which is constructed assum-
ing that y is uniformly distributed in [0, 2] and that . This spec-gp 0.4
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ification implies and .13 The figure shows how theˆq*p 0.4 qp 0.625
share of nonrenegotiable debt in total debt, , varies with the bar-P D /gn n
gaining power of the creditors, at the optimum (fig. 2A) and in the
laissez-faire equilibrium (fig. 2B).
The only value of q for which the set of laissez-faire equilibria coin-
cides with the optimum is . If , there is a corner equilibriumqp 0 q 1 0
with nonrenegotiable debt, which is inefficient since the optimal debt
structure involves some renegotiable debt. Recall that when lenders’ ex
post bargaining power is sufficiently strong (so that ), the optimalq 1 q*
debt structure is for the sovereign to issue only r-debt. As proposition
3 highlights, there also exists a range for which a sociallyˆq  [q*, q]
efficient r-debt equilibrium exists.
As figure 2 suggests and the next proposition confirms, there is gen-
erally too much n-debt issued when an equilibrium exists. This is, of
course, consistent with our broad intuition that n-debt tends to drive
out r-debt.
Proposition 4 (Gresham law for sovereign debt). The socially op-
timal amount of n-debt is less than or equal to the amount of n-debt
issued in a Nash equilibrium for all q.
Proof. If the unique Nash equilibrium is the corner equilibrium with
n-debt, then there is too much n-debt in equilibrium, since, from prop-
osition 2, the socially optimal fraction of n-debt is strictly less than one
for . If the unique Nash equilibrium is the corner equilibrium withq 1 0
r-debt, the amount of n-debt is equal to the socially optimal level. QED
VI. Public Policy
Given the complex effects of lender bargaining power in debt rene-
gotiations on equilibrium debt structure, there is no simple welfare-
improving policy intervention even in the highly simplified setting of
our model. In reality, of course, the policy intervention in sovereign
debt restructuring is even more complex, so much so that the debates
on the bankruptcy regime for sovereigns have not resulted in any new
policy initiative. The most notable new development has been a more
widespread introduction of CACs in sovereign bond issues, partly in
response to pressure by the U.S. Treasury Department and partly as a
way of preempting a more far-reaching and threatening intervention
(see Gelpern and Gulati 2007).
In terms of our model, this shift toward CACs can be interpreted as
a shift toward r-debt, and to the extent that there is too much n-debt
in equilibrium, this shift might be seen as a desirable step. However,
13 Closed-form solutions for the equilibrium can be derived in the case of a uniform
distribution. The details are available from the authors on request.
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note that a purely voluntary shift from n-debt to r-debt can be welfare
improving in our model only in the situation in which there are multiple
equilibria. In that case, it is conceivable that mild public pressure and
moral suasion could serve as an equilibrium selection device and induce
a switch from the n-debt corner equilibrium to an r-debt equilibrium.
In all other situations, a purely voluntary approach to CACs is unlikely
to work, and the implementation of some form of bankruptcy regime
for sovereigns is necessary to facilitate debt renegotiations. As our anal-
ysis makes clear, however, the introduction of a bankruptcy regime for
sovereigns has both benefits and costs and may sometimes be counter-
productive. Indeed, suppose that all debt becomes renegotiable under
the bankruptcy regime. Then the cost of this policy in our model is that
when , the sovereign, unable to issue n-debt, will be credit ra-q ! q*
tioned. This outcome is precisely what commentators on sovereign debt
restructuring such as Dooley (2000) and Shleifer (2003) have been
concerned about.
The bankruptcy regime is strictly beneficial only if lenders’ bargaining
power is sufficiently high: . In that case, the sovereign is able toq 1 q*
borrow in the form of r-debt, and the elimination of n-debt brings about
lower costs of sovereign debt crises without raising the cost of borrowing
for the sovereign. Thus, the analysis in our model highlights that in the
debate on the bankruptcy regime for sovereigns the advocates for reform
(Krueger) as well as the critics (Dooley, Shleifer) could have been right.
To the extent that the proponents of a bankruptcy regime had in mind
a world with relatively high lender bargaining power or envisioned a
bankruptcy institution in which lenders would have adequate protection,
they correctly pointed to the net welfare benefits of eliminating access
to n-debt for sovereign borrowers. If the critics had in mind a world
with lower lender bargaining power, they also correctly pointed to the
risks of undermining the sovereign bond market, if the restructuring
of bonds was facilitated.
Our analysis suggests two ways of reconciling these differences of
opinion. One is to make sure that lenders have sufficient bargaining
power in a bankruptcy regime for sovereigns. The other is to allow issuers
to opt out ex ante from the bankruptcy procedure. In other words, a
policy that lets the sovereign decide whether it wants to allow for n-debt
or not would guarantee that the policy intervention is always welfare
improving. Thus, in our model the optimal policy is as described in the
proposition below.
Proposition 5. A bankruptcy regime that makes the sovereign debt
renegotiable is optimal if and only if either
1. the regime guarantees a bargaining power to lenders such that
orq ≥ q*
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2. the sovereign can choose to opt out of the bankruptcy regime ex
ante.
Proof. See the discussion above.
We close our discussion of public policy with a note of caution, since
our analysis here is restrictive in one important respect. By assuming
that the amount the sovereign borrows, g, is fixed and known, we have
eliminated an important externality in sovereign debt markets: dilution
of outstanding debts by new pari passu debt issues. If the sovereign
cannot commit not to borrow more than g, then early lenders will seek
to protect themselves against this risk of dilution by issuing n-debt, which
de facto has higher priority. We pursue the analysis of this situation in
Bolton and Jeanne (2005) and show that when the sovereign cannot
commit to a fixed amount of borrowing g, then an efficient international
bankruptcy regime for sovereigns must also establish a form of seniority
or absolute priority rule.
VII. Conclusion
This article presents a model of sovereign debt crises that, although
stylized, is versatile enough to lend itself to the analysis of a number of
questions that have been discussed in the recent debates on the inter-
national financial architecture. The endogeneity of the debt structure
implies that the normative analysis has to go beyond statements that
debt workouts should be made more orderly and sovereign creditors
coordinated in a crisis. These statements are correct in an ex post sense,
but from an ex ante perspective, debt structures with nonrenegotiable
debt arise for a reason.
At the same time, our analysis does not support a Panglossian view
that sovereign debt contracts are efficient ex ante and that there is no
scope for welfare-improving reforms. We do find that sovereign debt
might be excessively difficult to restructure under laissez-faire (even
from an ex ante point of view) and that public intervention is warranted.
This model abstracted from a number of issues that may be quite
relevant in the real world. One such issue is debt maturity. Short-term
debt is another way of deflecting selective defaults. However, short-term
debt could make sovereigns excessively vulnerable to debt rollover crises
(Jeanne 2004). This issue is addressed in Bolton and Jeanne (2005) and
requires a different form of intervention than the simple facilitation of
debt renegotiations. Our analysis could also be extended to take into
consideration other agency problems than those between debtors and
creditors, in particular, political agency problems between citizens and
their governments. In our model it is unambiguously optimal to relax
the credit constraints in the international debt market because govern-
ments are assumed to be benevolent. The welfare analysis could be very
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different if decisions are made by self-interested policy makers who do
not maximize domestic welfare. Rationing the debt granted to policy
makers, then, could conceivably increase the welfare of their citizens.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider an interior equilibrium with and . Then the first-(D , D ) D 1 0 D 1 0r n r n
order condition of the sovereign’s problem implies that a marginal change in
the debt structure such that has a zero first-order effect(dD /d ) (dD /d )p 0n n r r
on the sovereign’s welfare, . We then show that the second-order effect,dUp 0
2 2 2 U  U  U2 2 2d Up dD  2 dD dD  dD , (A1)r r n n2 2D D D Dr r n n
is positive (i.e., U is strictly convex), implying that cannot be an equi-(D , D )r n
librium.
Using (3), one can compute
D (D /q) n r
U
p(1q) f(y)dy f(y)dy, (A2) 




Dr D (D /q)n r
2 U Drp (1q)f(D )qf D  ,n n( )2D qn
2 U Drp f D  ,n( )D D qn r
2 U 1 Drp f D  .n( )2D q qr
Substituting these expressions into (A1) in turn gives
1 Dr2 2 2d Up (1q)f(D )dD  f D  (qdD  dD ) 1 0,n n n n r( )q q
which proves the lemma. QED
Proof of Lemma 2
We determine whether a corner equilibrium exists by checking whether con-
dition (10) is satisfied. Let us start with the case of a corner equilibrium with
r-debt ( ). This equilibrium is robust to bidding by n-creditors offeringD p 0n
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if and only ifdD 1 0n
1 P U UndUp   dD ≤ 0.n( )1a P D Dr r n
For simplicity we consider the limit case in which the deviating n-lenders make
fair bids ( ). Using , (A2) and (A3) with , and , oneap 0 P p 1 D p 0 P D p gn n r r
has
 D /q rdU Drp f(y)dy (1q) f(y)dy f(y)dy  dD gn D /q 0 D /qr r
D /qr
q
p (g y)f(y)dy,g 0
where the second equality is obtained by substituting out using the zero-profitDr
condition for the r-lenders:
D /q r
qyf(y)dyD f(y)dyp g. (A4) r
0 D /qr
We define the function and show that there exists aD /qrh : q. (g y)f(y)dy∫0
threshold such that is negative if and only if . It will followˆ ˆq [q*, 1] h(q) q ≤ q
that condition (10), , is satisfied if and only if , as stated in theˆdU/dD ≤ 0 q ≤ qn
lemma.
To establish that exists, we show first that is increasing in q. Dividingqˆ h(7)
(A4) by q gives
m(q) 
g
p yf(y)dym(q) f(y)dy, 
q 0 m(q)
where . Differentiating this expression with respect to q, we see thatm(q)p D /qr
. From , it follows that′m (q) ! 0 g ! D ≤ D /qp m(q)r r
′ ′h (q)p m (q)[gm(q)]f(m(q)) 1 0.
The existence of then follows from the facts that andqˆ [q*, 1] h(q*) ! 0
. To establish the first inequality, note that since , weh(1) 1 0 lim m(q)pqrq*
have . The second inequality follows from equation (A4),h(q*)p g E(y) ! 0
which for reduces toqp 1
D r
h(1)p (g y)f(y)dyp (D  g) f(y)dy 1 0, r 
0 Dr
where the second equality uses (A4) and the inequality uses .D 1 gr
Finally, we consider the existence of a corner equilibrium with n-debt
( ). By condition (10) this equilibrium is robust to bidding by r-creditorsD p 0r
offering if and only ifdD 1 0r
1 P U UrdUp   dD ≤ 0.r( )1aP D Dn n r
We then compute the terms in this condition using (5), (6), (A2), and (A3)
with . Note that we have since the first term on theD p 0 Pp P p f(y)dy∫Dr r n n
right-hand side of (5) converges to zero as goes to zero. Condition (10)Dr




dUp f(y)dydD ≤ 0, r1a Dn
which is true. Thus the corner equilibrium with n-debt always exists.14 QED
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